original article:
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20120131rt.html
By RAMESH THAKUR
CANBERRA — The world faces two existential threats: climate change, and nuclear Armageddon. Action on both is required urgently. Tackling the first will impose significant economic costs and lifestyle adjustments, while tackling the second will bring economic benefits without any lifestyle implications.
Those who reject the first are derided as denialists; those dismissive of the second are praised as realists. Although action is needed now in order to keep the world on this side of the tipping point, a climate change-induced apocalypse will not occur until decades into the future.
A nuclear catastrophe could destroy us at any time, although, if our luck holds out, it could be delayed for another six decades. The uncomfortable reality is that nuclear peace has been upheld, owing as much to good luck as to sound stewardship.
Because we have learned to live with nuclear weapons for 66 years, we have become desensitized to the gravity and immediacy of the threat. The tyranny of complacency could yet exact a fearful price if we sleepwalk our way into a nuclear Armageddon. The time to lift the specter of a mushroom cloud from the international body politic is long overdue.
Nuclear weapons are strategic equalizers for weaker sides in conflict relationships, but they do not buy defense on the cheap. They can lead to the creation of a national security state with a premium on governmental secretiveness, reduced public accountability, and increased distance between citizens and governments. There is the added risk of proliferation to extremist elements through leakage, theft, state collapse and state capture.
In terms of opportunity costs, heavy military expenditure amounts to stealing from the poor. Nuclear weapons do not help to combat today's real threats of insurgency, terrorism, poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition and corruption.
As they said in the streets of Delhi in 1998: "No food, no clothing, no shelter? No worry, we have the bomb."
Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of a Russia-United States nuclear war has diminished, but the prospect of nuclear weapons being used by other nuclear-armed states or nonstate actors has become more plausible. As a result, we find ourselves at a familiar crossroads, confronting the same old choice between security in or from nuclear weapons.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has kept the nuclear nightmare at bay for over four decades. The number of countries with nuclear weapons is still in single figures. There has been substantial progress in reducing the number of nuclear warheads. However, the threat is still acute with a combined stockpile of more than 20,000 nuclear weapons; of these, 5,000 warheads are launch-ready and 2,000 are in a state of high operational alert.
The NPT enshrined multiple bargains. The nonnuclear countries agreed among themselves never to acquire nuclear weapons. They entered into a deal with the nuclear weapon states (NWS) whereby, in return for intrusive end-use control over nuclear and nuclear-related technology and material, they were granted favored access to nuclear technology, components and material. The nonnuclear countries struck a second deal with the NWS by which, in return for forever forswearing the bomb, the NWS would pursue good faith negotiations for complete nuclear disarmament.
Article 6 of the NPT is the only explicit multilateral disarmament commitment undertaken by all NWS. Those agreements are now under strain due to a fivefold challenge:
(1) The five NPT-licit nuclear powers (Britain, China, France, Russia and the U.S.) have disregarded NPT obligations to disarm.
(2) Three nuclear-armed states lie outside the NPT: India, Israel and Pakistan.
(3) As an intergovernmental agreement, the NPT does not cover nonstate groups, including terrorists.
(4) Some NPT members may be trying to elude their nonproliferation obligations, while North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT and tested nuclear weapons.
(5) Many countries are interested in nuclear energy owing to rising environmental anxieties and fossil fuel prices, raising issues of safety, security and weaponization.
The disquieting trend of a widening circle of NPT-licit and extra-NPT nuclear weapons powers has a self-generating effect in drawing other countries into the game of nuclear brinkmanship. Adding to the five sets of concerns is the sorry state of global governance mechanisms for nuclear arms control. The Conference on Disarmament cannot even agree on an agenda.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force and a fissile material cutoff treaty is no nearer conclusion.
After more than a decade in the doldrums, the nuclear agenda was re-energized by a coalition of four U.S. national security policy heavyweights — William Cohen, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn and William Perry — and given fresh momentum with President Barack Obama's Prague Promise in April 2009 to aim for the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.
The Washington Nuclear Summit looked closely at the safety and security requirements of nuclear programs and materials. The 2010 NPT Review Conference was a modest success. Commissions such as the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament and campaigns like Global Zero have helped to mobilize key constituencies.
Russia and the U.S. have negotiated, signed, ratified and brought into force a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (know as START II) to cut back nuclear arsenals by one third, limiting each to 1,550 deployable warheads.
Yet, there is a palpable and growing sense that START II could mark the end of nuclear disarmament progress, instead of being the first step on the road to abolition. There is little evidence of significant demand for disarmament by domestic political constituencies in the nuclear-armed states.
Tellingly, not one country that had an atomic bomb in 1968 when the NPT was signed has given it up. Judging by their actions rather than the rhetoric, all are determined to remain nuclear-armed. They are either modernizing nuclear forces and refining nuclear doctrines, or preparing to do so. For example, even after implementing START II, the U.S. will retain a cache of reserve warheads as a strategic hedge available for rapid uploading, should the need arise, and will build three new factories for increased nuclear warhead production capacity.
To would-be proliferators, the lesson is clear: Nuclear weapons are indispensable in today's world and for dealing with tomorrow's threats.
Reflecting the technical state of 1968 when the NPT was signed, Iran insists on its right to pursue the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes — to the point where it would be a screwdriver away from developing the bomb. The world is at a loss on how to stop Iran from crossing the weapons threshold and how to persuade, coax or coerce North Korea from stepping back into the NPT as a denuclearized member in good standing.
Japan is the emotional touchstone in the discourse as the world's only victim of the bomb. The U.S. has a special responsibility to lead the way to nuclear abolition as the only country to have used atomic bombs and as the world's biggest military power. The A-bomb was developed during World War II by a group of scientists brought together for the Manhattan Project under the directorship of J. Robert Oppenheimer.
Witnessing the first successful atomic test on July 16, 1945, Oppenheimer recalled the sacred Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gita: "If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, that would be like the splendor of the Mighty One."
Birth and death are symbiotically linked in the cycle of life. Oppenheimer also recalled the matching verse from the Gita: "Now I am become Death, the shatterer of worlds."
The same duality is omnipresent in every aspect of modern day Hiroshima. The citizens of Hiroshima, in rebuilding their city, have consecrated it as a testimonial to social resilience, human solidarity and nuclear abolition. Once again a beautiful, scenic and thriving city, Hiroshima lives by three codes: transformation from a military city to a city of peace; to forgive and atone, but never to forget; and, never again.
The case for abolition is simple, elegant and eloquent. Without strengthening national security, nuclear weapons diminish our common humanity and impoverish our soul. Their very destructiveness robs them of military utility against other nuclear powers and of political utility against nonnuclear countries.
As long as any country has any, others will want some. As long as they exist, they will be used one day again by design, accident or miscalculation.
Our goal, therefore, should be to make the transition from a world in which the role of nuclear weapons is seen as central to maintaining security, to one where they become progressively marginal and eventually entirely unnecessary. Like chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented, but like them, nuclear weapons can also be controlled, regulated, restricted and outlawed under an international regime that ensures strict compliance through effective and credible inspection, verification and enforcement.
The common task is to delegitimize the possession, deployment and use of nuclear weapons; to require no first use and sole purpose commitments; to reduce their numbers to 10 percent of present stockpiles (500 warheads each for Russia and the U.S., and 1,000 among the rest) by 2025; to reduce the high-risk reliance on them by introducing further degrees of separation between possession, deployment and use, by physically separating warheads from delivery systems and lengthening the decision-making fuse for the launch of nuclear weapons; to strengthen the authority and capacity of the International Atomic Energy Agency; to establish a multilateral fuel cycle; and to toughen up supply-side restrictions.
Because the NPT has been subverted from a prohibition into a purely nonproliferation regime, the time has come to look beyond it to a better alternative that gathers all the meritorious elements into one workable package in a nuclear weapons convention.
This will not self-materialize merely because we wish it so. Nor will it ever eventuate if we always push it into the distant future. There are many technical, legal and political challenges to overcome, but serious preparatory work needs to be started now, with conviction and commitment.
The most powerful stimulus to nuclear proliferation by others is the continuing possession of the bomb by some. Nuclear weapons could not proliferate if they did not exist; because they do, they will. The threat to use nuclear weapons, to deter their use by others and to prevent proliferation, legitimizes their possession, deployment and use. That which is legitimate cannot be stopped from proliferating.
Critics of the zero option want to keep their atomic bombs but deny them to others. They lack the intellectual honesty and the courage to acknowledge that the price of keeping nuclear arsenals is uncontrolled proliferation and to argue why a world of uncontrolled proliferation is better than abolition for national and international security.
The focus on nonproliferation to the neglect of disarmament ensures that we get neither. The best and only guarantee of nonproliferation is disarmament. If we want nonproliferation, therefore, we must prepare for disarmament.
Within our lifetime, we will either achieve nuclear abolition or have to live with nuclear proliferation and die with the use of nuclear weapons.
It is better to have the soft glow of satisfaction from the noble goal of achieving the banishment of nuclear weapons, than the harsh glare on the morning after these weapons have been used.
Ramesh Thakur is director of the Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, and professor of international relations at Australian National University. He previously was senior vice rector at United Nations University with the rank of assistant secretary general. His next project is "The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy." This article appeared in U.N. Chronicle 48:4 (October-December 2011), pp. 26-29
Thursday, February 9, 2012
Wednesday, February 8, 2012
Ask Umbra: Where do chemical-sucking plants go to die?
original article:
http://grist.org/pollution/ask-umbra-where-do-chemical-sucking-plants-go-to-die/
Q. Dear Umbra,
So cacti can remove selenium from soil. I’ve read in the past about different plants being able to “sop up” various nasty chemicals. My question is this: Then what? Are they to be harvested and dumped somewhere, so contaminating another piece of land, or are they allowed to live out their lives, die, keel over, and re-contaminate the same piece of land?
David B.
Greenfield, N.H.
A. Dearest David,
Is there anything our plant friends can’t do? They look nice, they often smell nice, and they agreeably exchange their oxygen for our carbon dioxide. They sequester carbon, they feed us, they shade our homes, they shelter critters, they make indoor air cleaner, they improve worker productivity, they can be ground up to make medicines and teas. I could go on and on. Or maybe I couldn’t, because I’m getting all choked up just thinking about the sacrifices plants make for us, the dunderheaded humans who lurch among them.
And now we have the temerity to ask them one more favor: Hey plants, while you’re at it, could you clean up the contamination we have created in the course of our brash modern lives? We seem to have left just a few splotches of pesticides, oil and gas, solvents, heavy metals, and radionuclides here and there. Mind absorbing those from the soil and groundwater?
Yes, say the plants obligingly. Just tell us where to go and what to do.
So we ask them to engage in phytoremediation, a process by which plants absorb contaminants into their roots, stems, and leaves. But we shouldn’t feel too sorry for our leafy friends, says USGS research hydrologist Jim Landmeyer, who has recently written a textbook on the topic: “Plants have been exposed to all sorts of nasties for the last 400 million years. They’ve figured out how to survive all that, and they’ve been endowed with the ability to clean up some of the things we’ve spilled.”
Landmeyer says the modern notion of phytoremediation took hold in the mid-1970s, thanks to the work of USDA researcher Rufus Chaney, and has been actively researched and applied since the early 1990s. As a clean-up method it’s fairly effective, it’s cheaper and less labor-intensive than options such as excavating soil, and it’s a mite prettier than a bulldozer. It also ideally leaves fertile soil behind so other plants can happily grow.
A thorough cleanup can take years, requiring several rounds of crops. In the case of heavy metals, plants known as hyperaccumulators absorb and store the offending substances until harvest day comes. When the contaminant in question is an organic compound such as gasoline, the plants are generally able to break it down into less potent forms, which they store or release.
Which plants are best suited for this job? Super-suckers include willow, poplar, ragweed, sunflowers, mustards, and some grasses. Certain genetic modifications can make them even … suckier. And these leafy overachievers, natural and modified, are in action all across the country, from the selenium-filled deserts of California to lead-addled backyards in Boston. The process has been embraced by the government — which has tested it at various places including more than 200 Superfund sites and continues to research its broader applications — and by some biotech and remediation companies too.
When the plants have done their job, they are harvested, and considered hazardous biomass. They are usually compacted, since they’re so squishable, then either sent to a landfill or burned. Ish, you’re thinking. What good is removing contamination from the soil if we just put it back in the ground or in the air? Good question. In theory, carefully constructed landfills and incinerators limit the release of harmful contents. Plus, the squished plants take up far less room than acres of excavated soil. Meanwhile, we have returned a contaminated area to sustainable growing conditions, or to a potential location for a new gas station.
Two possible economic side benefits to the incineration situation: This harvested biomass can be burned to create energy, and often is in Europe, says Landmeyer. And sometimes, in an operation known as phytomining, the heavy-metal ore is retrieved from the plants’ ashes, then recycled or resold.
There you have it, David. All your phytoremediation questions answered. It’s not a perfect process, but so far it looks better than many alternatives. So next time you see a cactus that looks like it’s just idly standing by, give it a nod for taking on one of the dirtiest jobs around.
Hyperaccumulatingly,
Umbra
Thursday, January 19, 2012
Groundwater Contamination (Tritium) at Nuclear Plants
original article:
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1012/ML101270439.pdf
Overview:
Tritium is a mildly radioactive type of hydrogen that occurs both naturally and during the operation of nuclear power plants. Water containing tritium and other radioactive substances is normally released from nuclear plants under controlled, monitored conditions the NRC mandates to protect public health and safety. The NRC recently identified several instances of unintended tritium releases, and all available information shows no threat to the public. Nonetheless, the NRC is reviewing these incidents to ensure nuclear plant operators have taken appropriate action and to determine what, if any, changes are needed to the agency's rules and regulations. The following information provides further basic information on tritium and other isotopes released from nuclear power plants, outlines the status of the unintended tritium leaks and the NRC's actions.
Introduction
This is a list of reactor sites that experienced a leak or spill to the environment at some time since initial startup. The list only includes those leaks or spills where tritium in the leak source or the groundwater sample was greater than 20,000 pCi/L. The term “leaks and spills” includes all types of non-routine releases in which tritium from reactor operation contacted the soil in an unintended fashion.
Source of Information
This information was compiled by NRC staff and is based on available records (e.g., Annual Effluent Reports, Annual Environmental Reports, Groundwater Questionnaires, Preliminary Notifications, Event Notifications, Licensee Event Reports (LERs), NRC Inspection Reports, Special Reports, and other documents submitted by the licensees to the NRC). Although the records search was extensive, extending back to the 1970s, the search was not all inclusive.
Purpose
The NRC has received many questions from the public, the news media, and politicians
concerning spills and leaks at power reactor sites. Although most of these questions were similarly focused on groundwater contamination, the questions were different enough to produce significant variations in the responses. This list is intended to be the best single response to those questions involving “numbers” such as:
• How many sites have had leaks or spills of radioactive material?
• What concentrations of tritium were involved?
• What are the current tritium concentrations at each of the sites?
Contents
The tritium concentrations listed are approximate historical maximums, and approximate current concentrations. Some numbers have been rounded off for clarity. Although there may be some data in the historical records showing concentrations slightly different than the values listed, the values shown provide a reasonable indication of the magnitude and extent of the historical leaks and spills as well at the current conditions at these sites.
The value listed as the “current conditions” lists the highest tritium concentration found in the environment, on facility property, at the current time or within approximately the last year. Although in many cases the actual current tritium concentrations will be less than the value indicated, this method provides a reasonable approximation of the plume concentration currently on each site.
Samples are collected from onsite and offsite locations. Samples are collected from both drinking water wells and non-drinking water sample points (e.g., storm drains, man holes, bore holes, piezometer tubes, monitoring wells, surface water, puddles, and rain water). All of these samples are evaluated for inclusion in this list. Although some values in the list exceed 20,000 pCi per liter, none of those samples were from a drinking water well or from a municipal drinking water system. In fact, although samples are collected from drinking water wells and municipal
drinking water systems, none of those samples have ever exceeded 20,000 pCi per liter. As a result, a value of 20,000 pCi/L in this list does not imply the drinking water standard in EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Act has been exceeded.
After a radioactive spill or leak, tritium is generally the first radionuclide to be identified in groundwater. This is because tritium travels through the soil faster than other radionuclides. Leaks and spills at some sites (e.g., Indian Point, Braidwood) involved nuclides other than tritium (e.g., Cobalt-60, Cobalt-58, Cesium-134, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, Nickel-63), but those radionuclides are not included in this list.
The current status of these sites reflects the most recently available information as of the date shown at the top of this page. This list will be revised as new information becomes available.
Significant Changes in this Version
• The current status of each site was reviewed and updated accordingly.
• Three reactor sites were added to the list.
• Some of the historical releases were updated based on recent information.
Summary
There are 65 locations in the United States where commercial nuclear power plants are
operating. Records indicate 41 of these sites have had leaks or spills that involved tritium in excess of 20,000 pCi/L at some time during their operating history. Sixteen sites are currently reporting tritium, from a leak or spill, in excess of 20,000 pCi/L. Although many sites have had leaks or spills involving tritium, no site is currently detecting tritium in the offsite environment, or in drinking water, in excess of 20,000 pCi/L. Tritium rapidly disperses and dissipates in the environment, and as a result, tritium from leaks and spills is typically not detected outside the facility boundary. The historical data indicates in only one instance, at Braidwood, was tritium from a leak or spill found in the offsite environment
in excess of 20,000 pCi/L. All samples from Braidwood since 2008 indicate tritium is no longer present in excess of 20,000 pCi/L in either the onsite or the offsite environment.
Conclusion
The existing complement of 104 power reactors, each operating for approximately 20-40 years, represents approximately 3,000 reactor years of operation. During that time, leaks and spills involving tritium have occurred at many commercial power reactors in the United States. This list demonstrates that in all of that time, and with all the leaks and spills that have occurred, no drinking water supply has exceeded the allowable level for tritium specified in EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Act
List of Historical Leaks and Spills At U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
more reading:
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/grndwtr-contam-tritium.html
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1012/ML101270439.pdf
Overview:
Tritium is a mildly radioactive type of hydrogen that occurs both naturally and during the operation of nuclear power plants. Water containing tritium and other radioactive substances is normally released from nuclear plants under controlled, monitored conditions the NRC mandates to protect public health and safety. The NRC recently identified several instances of unintended tritium releases, and all available information shows no threat to the public. Nonetheless, the NRC is reviewing these incidents to ensure nuclear plant operators have taken appropriate action and to determine what, if any, changes are needed to the agency's rules and regulations. The following information provides further basic information on tritium and other isotopes released from nuclear power plants, outlines the status of the unintended tritium leaks and the NRC's actions.
Introduction
This is a list of reactor sites that experienced a leak or spill to the environment at some time since initial startup. The list only includes those leaks or spills where tritium in the leak source or the groundwater sample was greater than 20,000 pCi/L. The term “leaks and spills” includes all types of non-routine releases in which tritium from reactor operation contacted the soil in an unintended fashion.
Source of Information
This information was compiled by NRC staff and is based on available records (e.g., Annual Effluent Reports, Annual Environmental Reports, Groundwater Questionnaires, Preliminary Notifications, Event Notifications, Licensee Event Reports (LERs), NRC Inspection Reports, Special Reports, and other documents submitted by the licensees to the NRC). Although the records search was extensive, extending back to the 1970s, the search was not all inclusive.
Purpose
The NRC has received many questions from the public, the news media, and politicians
concerning spills and leaks at power reactor sites. Although most of these questions were similarly focused on groundwater contamination, the questions were different enough to produce significant variations in the responses. This list is intended to be the best single response to those questions involving “numbers” such as:
• How many sites have had leaks or spills of radioactive material?
• What concentrations of tritium were involved?
• What are the current tritium concentrations at each of the sites?
Contents
The tritium concentrations listed are approximate historical maximums, and approximate current concentrations. Some numbers have been rounded off for clarity. Although there may be some data in the historical records showing concentrations slightly different than the values listed, the values shown provide a reasonable indication of the magnitude and extent of the historical leaks and spills as well at the current conditions at these sites.
The value listed as the “current conditions” lists the highest tritium concentration found in the environment, on facility property, at the current time or within approximately the last year. Although in many cases the actual current tritium concentrations will be less than the value indicated, this method provides a reasonable approximation of the plume concentration currently on each site.
Samples are collected from onsite and offsite locations. Samples are collected from both drinking water wells and non-drinking water sample points (e.g., storm drains, man holes, bore holes, piezometer tubes, monitoring wells, surface water, puddles, and rain water). All of these samples are evaluated for inclusion in this list. Although some values in the list exceed 20,000 pCi per liter, none of those samples were from a drinking water well or from a municipal drinking water system. In fact, although samples are collected from drinking water wells and municipal
drinking water systems, none of those samples have ever exceeded 20,000 pCi per liter. As a result, a value of 20,000 pCi/L in this list does not imply the drinking water standard in EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Act has been exceeded.
After a radioactive spill or leak, tritium is generally the first radionuclide to be identified in groundwater. This is because tritium travels through the soil faster than other radionuclides. Leaks and spills at some sites (e.g., Indian Point, Braidwood) involved nuclides other than tritium (e.g., Cobalt-60, Cobalt-58, Cesium-134, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, Nickel-63), but those radionuclides are not included in this list.
The current status of these sites reflects the most recently available information as of the date shown at the top of this page. This list will be revised as new information becomes available.
Significant Changes in this Version
• The current status of each site was reviewed and updated accordingly.
• Three reactor sites were added to the list.
• Some of the historical releases were updated based on recent information.
Summary
There are 65 locations in the United States where commercial nuclear power plants are
operating. Records indicate 41 of these sites have had leaks or spills that involved tritium in excess of 20,000 pCi/L at some time during their operating history. Sixteen sites are currently reporting tritium, from a leak or spill, in excess of 20,000 pCi/L. Although many sites have had leaks or spills involving tritium, no site is currently detecting tritium in the offsite environment, or in drinking water, in excess of 20,000 pCi/L. Tritium rapidly disperses and dissipates in the environment, and as a result, tritium from leaks and spills is typically not detected outside the facility boundary. The historical data indicates in only one instance, at Braidwood, was tritium from a leak or spill found in the offsite environment
in excess of 20,000 pCi/L. All samples from Braidwood since 2008 indicate tritium is no longer present in excess of 20,000 pCi/L in either the onsite or the offsite environment.
Conclusion
The existing complement of 104 power reactors, each operating for approximately 20-40 years, represents approximately 3,000 reactor years of operation. During that time, leaks and spills involving tritium have occurred at many commercial power reactors in the United States. This list demonstrates that in all of that time, and with all the leaks and spills that have occurred, no drinking water supply has exceeded the allowable level for tritium specified in EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Act
List of Historical Leaks and Spills At U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
more reading:
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/grndwtr-contam-tritium.html
Tuesday, January 10, 2012
Dioxins in the Food Supply
original article:
http://nutritionfacts.org/videos/dioxins-in-the-food-supply/
video:
http://nutritionfacts.org/videos/dioxins-in-the-food-supply/
video:
Wednesday, December 21, 2011
Security in Flu Study Was Paramount, Scientist Says
original article: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/health/security-in-h5n1-bird-flu-study-was-paramount-scientist-says.html?hp
The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, concerned about bioterrorism and a worldwide pandemic, has for the first time ever urged scientific journals to keep details out of reports that they intend to publish on a highly transmissible form of the bird flu called A(H5N1), which has a high death rate in people. Working with ferrets, researchers on the virus at two medical centers — Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, in the Netherlands, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison — are investigating genetic changes that may make the virus more easily transmittable to people. Doreen Carvajal spoke with Ron A. M. Fouchier, the lead researcher at the Erasmus Center. An edited and condensed version of the conversation follows.
Related
Q. What was your reaction to efforts to censor the research?
A. The draft recommendations reached us at the end of November, and since that time we have been working with the journals and the international organizations to figure out a way to deal with it, because this is an unprecedented issue in science.
In principle, we of course understand the statement by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity and the United States government. This is dual-use research, meaning research that can be used for good and bad purposes.
The N.S.A.B.B. advice is that we can share this in a restricted form.
We would be perfectly happy if this could be executed, but we have some doubts. We have made a list of experts that we could share this with, and that list adds up to well over 100 organizations around the globe, and probably 1,000 experts. As soon as you share information with more than 10 people, the information will be on the street. And so we have serious doubts whether this advice can be followed, strictly speaking.
Q. So what is the solution?
A. This is very important research. It raises a number of important issues that need to be shared with the scientific community. And because we cannot keep this confidential with such a large group. I think the only solution is to publish in detail.
Q. How do you sum up the most vital information that should be shared?
A. There are three aspects that need to be shared.
The first part of the work can be shared without detail. The message is that H5N1 can go airborne between mammals. Of course, we have also showed how this virus can go airborne, and which mutations cause this virus to go airborne. And those mutations, the info of those mutations, need to come in the hands of people who are doing research — for instance, the people who are doing surveillance in countries affected by H5N1. If those mutations would be detected in the field, then those countries affected should act very aggressively to stamp out the outbreaks, to protect the world.
So if we can stamp this virus out before it actually emerges, then we prevent a pandemic. And I think that is what we all want.
But even if we would not be able to prevent a pandemic — and let’s assume that there is a very small chance that the virus will emerge in nature — then our last resource would be drugs and vaccines.
Now, drugs and vaccines are normally evaluated with bird flu viruses that are not adapted to mammals. Now the questions are whether those vaccines are effective against the mammal-adapted virus. And so by doing this research, we are able to get ahead of this virus emerging in the field to test whether our last resource would be functional.
So the three things are: one is the simple fact that it can go airborne. That means that all the advice from the scientific community to outbreak countries now can be more unanimous that H5N1 is a very big risk to human health. The second thing is surveillance, and the third thing is preparation by evaluating vaccines and antivirals.
Q. What were the precautions that you took, if any, in the course of your research to guard against terrorism?
A. This experiment was not designed overnight. We started planning for these experiments 10 years ago, consulting with experts nationally and internationally about how to do this safely. We built special facilities to protect people against the virus and the virus against the people.
Q. What was special about your facilities, in the Netherlands?
A. The biosafety information can be found on our Web site. The biosecurity, I cannot release any information.
Q. Over that period, were there any safety issues?
A. Everything was smooth. There were layers upon layers upon layers of biosecurity measures. The design of this type of facility was such that it would be very unlikely for all barriers to break at the same time.
Q. How did you conduct the research?
A. I cannot disclose the methods, because the methods are supposed to be a recipe for bioterrorism.
We mutated the virus and then performed a natural selection for additional mutations. We were testing on ferrets. We designed the experiment over the course of 10 years. We have been doing hands-on work on the experiments for the last two years, testing on dozens of ferrets.
Q. Is the research finished?
A. We are continuing the work. We need to evaluate vaccines, and we need to evaluate antiviral drugs and how well they work against this virus. We also need to have a more general understanding of whether this virus could acquire abilities of airborne transmission in other ways.
Q. Have you seen any sign that government authorities or anyone else was monitoring you because of concerns about terrorism?
A. I am sure I am being monitored by many governments. But also the usual states, not only the rogue countries. If they are monitoring me, they are doing a good job of staying out of my sight.
Q. How easy is it to recreate this virus?
A. It is not very easy. You need a very sophisticated specialist team and sophisticated facilities to do this. And in our opinion, nature is the biggest bioterrorist. There are many pathogens in nature that you could get your hands on very easily, and if you released those in the human population, we would be in trouble.
And therefore we think that if bioterror or biowarfare would be a problem, there are so many easy ways of doing it that nobody would take this H5N1 virus and do this very difficult thing to achieve it.
You could not do this work in your garage if you are a terrorist organization. But what you can do is get viruses out of the wild and grow them in your garage. There are terrorist opportunities that are much, much easier than to genetically modify H5N1 bird flu virus that are probably much more effective.
Q. How difficult would it be to recreate it?
A. If we get this in the hands of labs that can already do it — such as the C.D.C. or N.I.H. laboratories — they would be able to repeat our work in a matter of weeks. But for rogue countries or terrorist groups, this would take years of work.
Q. So why such concern — aren’t you offering information that will protect countries?
A. That’s a question you should address to the advisory board. That’s our opinion, and we think this work should have been published in detail.
Q. What is your next step?
A. We will respect this advice, because this is the consensus for now. And we will work toward publishing a manuscript without the details, and we will wait on how the N.S.A.B.B. and the United States government envisages sharing the information in a classified way. As I said, we have doubts this is possible.
Q. Did you consider publishing anyway?
A. Yes, we could even launch it on our own Web site. We could do that. Of course, that’s not the smart way to move. There is an intense debate in our field, and it would be silly for us to act on our own on this. It’s better to have this discussion in the scientific and health community and see where it goes. If everybody agrees that this is the way to go, then we will respect that.
Q. What was the reaction from colleagues?
A. The only people who want to hold back are the biosecurity experts. They show zero tolerance to risk. The public health specialists do not have this zero tolerance. I have not spoken to a single public health specialist who was against publication. So we are going to see an interesting debate over the next few weeks between biosecurity experts and public health experts who think this information should be in the public domain.
The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, concerned about bioterrorism and a worldwide pandemic, has for the first time ever urged scientific journals to keep details out of reports that they intend to publish on a highly transmissible form of the bird flu called A(H5N1), which has a high death rate in people. Working with ferrets, researchers on the virus at two medical centers — Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, in the Netherlands, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison — are investigating genetic changes that may make the virus more easily transmittable to people. Doreen Carvajal spoke with Ron A. M. Fouchier, the lead researcher at the Erasmus Center. An edited and condensed version of the conversation follows.
Related
Q. What was your reaction to efforts to censor the research?
A. The draft recommendations reached us at the end of November, and since that time we have been working with the journals and the international organizations to figure out a way to deal with it, because this is an unprecedented issue in science.
In principle, we of course understand the statement by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity and the United States government. This is dual-use research, meaning research that can be used for good and bad purposes.
The N.S.A.B.B. advice is that we can share this in a restricted form.
We would be perfectly happy if this could be executed, but we have some doubts. We have made a list of experts that we could share this with, and that list adds up to well over 100 organizations around the globe, and probably 1,000 experts. As soon as you share information with more than 10 people, the information will be on the street. And so we have serious doubts whether this advice can be followed, strictly speaking.
Q. So what is the solution?
A. This is very important research. It raises a number of important issues that need to be shared with the scientific community. And because we cannot keep this confidential with such a large group. I think the only solution is to publish in detail.
Q. How do you sum up the most vital information that should be shared?
A. There are three aspects that need to be shared.
The first part of the work can be shared without detail. The message is that H5N1 can go airborne between mammals. Of course, we have also showed how this virus can go airborne, and which mutations cause this virus to go airborne. And those mutations, the info of those mutations, need to come in the hands of people who are doing research — for instance, the people who are doing surveillance in countries affected by H5N1. If those mutations would be detected in the field, then those countries affected should act very aggressively to stamp out the outbreaks, to protect the world.
So if we can stamp this virus out before it actually emerges, then we prevent a pandemic. And I think that is what we all want.
But even if we would not be able to prevent a pandemic — and let’s assume that there is a very small chance that the virus will emerge in nature — then our last resource would be drugs and vaccines.
Now, drugs and vaccines are normally evaluated with bird flu viruses that are not adapted to mammals. Now the questions are whether those vaccines are effective against the mammal-adapted virus. And so by doing this research, we are able to get ahead of this virus emerging in the field to test whether our last resource would be functional.
So the three things are: one is the simple fact that it can go airborne. That means that all the advice from the scientific community to outbreak countries now can be more unanimous that H5N1 is a very big risk to human health. The second thing is surveillance, and the third thing is preparation by evaluating vaccines and antivirals.
Q. What were the precautions that you took, if any, in the course of your research to guard against terrorism?
A. This experiment was not designed overnight. We started planning for these experiments 10 years ago, consulting with experts nationally and internationally about how to do this safely. We built special facilities to protect people against the virus and the virus against the people.
Q. What was special about your facilities, in the Netherlands?
A. The biosafety information can be found on our Web site. The biosecurity, I cannot release any information.
Q. Over that period, were there any safety issues?
A. Everything was smooth. There were layers upon layers upon layers of biosecurity measures. The design of this type of facility was such that it would be very unlikely for all barriers to break at the same time.
Q. How did you conduct the research?
A. I cannot disclose the methods, because the methods are supposed to be a recipe for bioterrorism.
We mutated the virus and then performed a natural selection for additional mutations. We were testing on ferrets. We designed the experiment over the course of 10 years. We have been doing hands-on work on the experiments for the last two years, testing on dozens of ferrets.
Q. Is the research finished?
A. We are continuing the work. We need to evaluate vaccines, and we need to evaluate antiviral drugs and how well they work against this virus. We also need to have a more general understanding of whether this virus could acquire abilities of airborne transmission in other ways.
Q. Have you seen any sign that government authorities or anyone else was monitoring you because of concerns about terrorism?
A. I am sure I am being monitored by many governments. But also the usual states, not only the rogue countries. If they are monitoring me, they are doing a good job of staying out of my sight.
Q. How easy is it to recreate this virus?
A. It is not very easy. You need a very sophisticated specialist team and sophisticated facilities to do this. And in our opinion, nature is the biggest bioterrorist. There are many pathogens in nature that you could get your hands on very easily, and if you released those in the human population, we would be in trouble.
And therefore we think that if bioterror or biowarfare would be a problem, there are so many easy ways of doing it that nobody would take this H5N1 virus and do this very difficult thing to achieve it.
You could not do this work in your garage if you are a terrorist organization. But what you can do is get viruses out of the wild and grow them in your garage. There are terrorist opportunities that are much, much easier than to genetically modify H5N1 bird flu virus that are probably much more effective.
Q. How difficult would it be to recreate it?
A. If we get this in the hands of labs that can already do it — such as the C.D.C. or N.I.H. laboratories — they would be able to repeat our work in a matter of weeks. But for rogue countries or terrorist groups, this would take years of work.
Q. So why such concern — aren’t you offering information that will protect countries?
A. That’s a question you should address to the advisory board. That’s our opinion, and we think this work should have been published in detail.
Q. What is your next step?
A. We will respect this advice, because this is the consensus for now. And we will work toward publishing a manuscript without the details, and we will wait on how the N.S.A.B.B. and the United States government envisages sharing the information in a classified way. As I said, we have doubts this is possible.
Q. Did you consider publishing anyway?
A. Yes, we could even launch it on our own Web site. We could do that. Of course, that’s not the smart way to move. There is an intense debate in our field, and it would be silly for us to act on our own on this. It’s better to have this discussion in the scientific and health community and see where it goes. If everybody agrees that this is the way to go, then we will respect that.
Q. What was the reaction from colleagues?
A. The only people who want to hold back are the biosecurity experts. They show zero tolerance to risk. The public health specialists do not have this zero tolerance. I have not spoken to a single public health specialist who was against publication. So we are going to see an interesting debate over the next few weeks between biosecurity experts and public health experts who think this information should be in the public domain.
Monday, November 14, 2011
Study links Parkinson's disease to industrial solvent
original article:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-15639440
snippets:
An international study has linked an industrial solvent to Parkinson's disease.
Researchers found a six-fold increase in the risk of developing Parkinson's in individuals exposed in the workplace to trichloroethylene (TCE).
Although many uses for TCE have been banned around the world, the chemical is still used as a degreasing agent.
The research was based on analysis of 99 pairs of twins selected from US data records.
Parkinson's can result in limb tremors, slowed movement and speech impairment, but the exact cause of the disease is still unknown, and there is no cure.
Research to date suggests a mix of genetic and environmental factors may be responsible. A link has previously been made with pesticide use.
'Significant association'
The researchers from institutes in the US, Canada, Germany and Argentina, wanted to examine the impact of solvent exposure - specifically six solvents including TCE.
They looked at 99 sets of twins, one twin with Parkinson's, the other without.
Because twins are genetically very similar or identical and often share certain lifestyle characteristics, twins were thought to provide a better control group, reducing the likelihood of spurious results.
The twins were interviewed to build up a work history and calculate likely exposure to solvents. They were also asked about hobbies.
The findings are presented as the first study to report a "significant association" between TCE exposure and Parkinson's and suggest exposure to the solvent was likely to result in a six-fold increase in the chances of developing the disease.
The study also adjudged exposure to two other solvents, perchloroethylene (PERC) and carbon tetrachloride (CCl4), "tended towards significant risk of developing the disease".
No statistical link was found with the other three solvents examined in the study - toluene, xylene and n-hexane.
"Our study confirms that common environmental contaminants may increase the risk of developing Parkinson's, which has considerable public health implications," said Dr Samuel Goldman of The Parkinson's Institute in Sunnyvale, California, who co-led the study published in the journal Annals of Neurology.
He added: "Our findings, as well as prior case reports, suggest a lag time of up to 40 years between TCE exposure and onset of Parkinson's, providing a critical window of opportunity to potentially slow the disease before clinical symptoms appear."
Water contaminant
TCE has been used in paints, glue, carpet cleaners, dry-cleaning solutions and as a degreaser. It has been banned in the food and pharmaceutical industries in most regions of the world since the 1970s, due to concerns over its toxicity.
In 1997, the US authorities banned its use as an anaesthetic, skin disinfectant, grain fumigant and coffee decaffeinating agent, but it is still used as a degreasing agent for metal parts.
Computer image of affected neurons in the brain of Parkinson's patients A computer image of affected neurons in the brain of Parkinson's patients
Groundwater contamination by TCE is widespread, with studies estimating up to 30% of US drinking water supplies are contaminated with TCE. In Europe, it was reclassified in 2001 as a "category 2" carcinogen, although it is still used in industrial applications.
PERC, like TCE, is used as a dry-cleaning agent and degreasing agent, and is found in many household products. CCl4's major historical use was in the manufacture of chlorofluorocarbons for use as refrigerants, but it has also been used a fumigant to kill insects in grain.
Commenting on the paper, Dr Michelle Gardner, Research Development Manager at Parkinson's UK, said: "This is the first study to show that the solvent TCE may be associated with an increased risk of developing Parkinson's.
"It is important to highlight that many of the previous uses of this solvent have been discontinued for safety reasons over 30 years ago and that safety and protection in work places where strong chemicals such as this solvent are used has greatly improved in recent years."
She also called for more research to confirm the link between TCE and other solvents with Parkinson's.
"Further larger-scale studies on populations with more defined exposures are needed to confirm the link," she said.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-15639440
snippets:
An international study has linked an industrial solvent to Parkinson's disease.
Researchers found a six-fold increase in the risk of developing Parkinson's in individuals exposed in the workplace to trichloroethylene (TCE).
Although many uses for TCE have been banned around the world, the chemical is still used as a degreasing agent.
The research was based on analysis of 99 pairs of twins selected from US data records.
Parkinson's can result in limb tremors, slowed movement and speech impairment, but the exact cause of the disease is still unknown, and there is no cure.
Research to date suggests a mix of genetic and environmental factors may be responsible. A link has previously been made with pesticide use.
'Significant association'
The researchers from institutes in the US, Canada, Germany and Argentina, wanted to examine the impact of solvent exposure - specifically six solvents including TCE.
They looked at 99 sets of twins, one twin with Parkinson's, the other without.
Because twins are genetically very similar or identical and often share certain lifestyle characteristics, twins were thought to provide a better control group, reducing the likelihood of spurious results.
The twins were interviewed to build up a work history and calculate likely exposure to solvents. They were also asked about hobbies.
The findings are presented as the first study to report a "significant association" between TCE exposure and Parkinson's and suggest exposure to the solvent was likely to result in a six-fold increase in the chances of developing the disease.
The study also adjudged exposure to two other solvents, perchloroethylene (PERC) and carbon tetrachloride (CCl4), "tended towards significant risk of developing the disease".
No statistical link was found with the other three solvents examined in the study - toluene, xylene and n-hexane.
"Our study confirms that common environmental contaminants may increase the risk of developing Parkinson's, which has considerable public health implications," said Dr Samuel Goldman of The Parkinson's Institute in Sunnyvale, California, who co-led the study published in the journal Annals of Neurology.
He added: "Our findings, as well as prior case reports, suggest a lag time of up to 40 years between TCE exposure and onset of Parkinson's, providing a critical window of opportunity to potentially slow the disease before clinical symptoms appear."
Water contaminant
TCE has been used in paints, glue, carpet cleaners, dry-cleaning solutions and as a degreaser. It has been banned in the food and pharmaceutical industries in most regions of the world since the 1970s, due to concerns over its toxicity.
In 1997, the US authorities banned its use as an anaesthetic, skin disinfectant, grain fumigant and coffee decaffeinating agent, but it is still used as a degreasing agent for metal parts.
Computer image of affected neurons in the brain of Parkinson's patients A computer image of affected neurons in the brain of Parkinson's patients
Groundwater contamination by TCE is widespread, with studies estimating up to 30% of US drinking water supplies are contaminated with TCE. In Europe, it was reclassified in 2001 as a "category 2" carcinogen, although it is still used in industrial applications.
PERC, like TCE, is used as a dry-cleaning agent and degreasing agent, and is found in many household products. CCl4's major historical use was in the manufacture of chlorofluorocarbons for use as refrigerants, but it has also been used a fumigant to kill insects in grain.
Commenting on the paper, Dr Michelle Gardner, Research Development Manager at Parkinson's UK, said: "This is the first study to show that the solvent TCE may be associated with an increased risk of developing Parkinson's.
"It is important to highlight that many of the previous uses of this solvent have been discontinued for safety reasons over 30 years ago and that safety and protection in work places where strong chemicals such as this solvent are used has greatly improved in recent years."
She also called for more research to confirm the link between TCE and other solvents with Parkinson's.
"Further larger-scale studies on populations with more defined exposures are needed to confirm the link," she said.
Wednesday, November 9, 2011
The Hidden Toll of Traffic Jams
original article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203733504577024000381790904.html?mod=WSJ_hp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsThird
snippets:
Congested cities are fast becoming test tubes for scientists studying the impact of traffic fumes on the brain.
As roadways choke on traffic, researchers suspect that the tailpipe exhaust from cars and trucks—especially tiny carbon particles already implicated in heart disease, cancer and respiratory ailments—may also injure brain cells and synapses key to learning and memory.
New public-health studies and laboratory experiments suggest that, at every stage of life, traffic fumes exact a measurable toll on mental capacity, intelligence and emotional stability...
No one knows whether regular commuters breathing heavy traffic fumes suffer any lasting brain effect. Researchers have only studied the potential impact based on where people live and where air-pollution levels are highest. Even if there were any chronic cognitive effect on drivers, it could easily be too small to measure reliably or might be swamped by other health factors such as stress, diet or exercise that affect the brain, experts say.
Recent studies show that breathing street-level fumes for just 30 minutes can intensify electrical activity in brain regions responsible for behavior, personality and decision-making, changes that are suggestive of stress, scientists in the Netherlands recently discovered. Breathing normal city air with high levels of traffic exhaust for 90 days can change the way that genes turn on or off among the elderly; it can also leave a molecular mark on the genome of a newborn for life, separate research teams at Columbia University and Harvard University reported this year.
Children in areas affected by high levels of emissions, on average, scored more poorly on intelligence tests and were more prone to depression, anxiety and attention problems than children growing up in cleaner air, separate research teams in New York, Boston, Beijing, and Krakow, Poland, found. And older men and women long exposed to higher levels of traffic-related particles and ozone had memory and reasoning problems that effectively added five years to their mental age, other university researchers in Boston reported this year. The emissions may also heighten the risk of Alzheimer's disease and speed the effects of Parkinson's disease.
Reviewing birth records, Dr. Volk and her colleagues calculated that children born to mothers living within 1,000 feet of a major road or freeway in Los Angeles, San Francisco or Sacramento were twice as likely to have autism, independent of gender, ethnicity and education level, as well as maternal age, exposure to tobacco smoke or other factors. The findings were published this year in the journal Environmental Health Perspectives.
Exhaust fumes can extend farther from roadways than once thought. Traffic fumes from some major L.A. freeways reached up to 1.5 miles downwind—10 times farther than previously believed....
Scientists believe that simple steps to speed traffic are a factor in reducing some public-health problems. In New Jersey, premature births, a risk factor for cognitive delays, in areas around highway toll plazas dropped 10.8% after the introduction of E-ZPass, which eased traffic congestion and reduced exhaust fumes, according to reports published in scientific journals this year and in 2009...
Scientists are only beginning to understand the basic biology of car exhaust's toxic neural effects, especially from prenatal or lifetime exposures. "It is hard to disentangle all the things in auto exhaust and sort out the effects of traffic from all the other possibilities," says Dr. Currie, who studies the relationship between traffic and infant health.
Researchers in Los Angeles, the U.S.'s most congested city, are studying lab mice raised on air piped in from a nearby freeway. They discovered that the particles inhaled by the mice—each particle less than one-thousandth the width of a human hair—somehow affected the brain, causing inflammation and altering neurochemistry among neurons involved in learning and memory.
To study the effect of exhaust on expectant mothers, Frederica Perera at Columbia University's Center for Children's Environmental Health began in 1998 to equip hundreds of pregnant women with personal air monitors to measure the chemistry of the air they breathed. As the babies were born, Dr. Perera and colleagues tested some of the infants and discovered a distinctive biochemical mark in the DNA of about half of them, left by prenatal exposure to high levels of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in exhaust.
By age 3, the children who were exposed prenatally to high exhaust levels were developing mental capacities fractionally more slowly. By age 5, their IQ scores averaged about four points lower on standard intelligence tests than those of less exposed children, the team reported in 2009. The differences, while small, were significant in terms of later educational development, the researchers said.
By age 7, the children were more likely to show symptoms of anxiety, depression and attention problems, the researchers reported this year in Environmental Health Perspectives.
"The mother's exposure—what she breathed into her lungs—could affect her child's later behavior," Dr. Perera says. "The placenta is not the perfect barrier we once thought."
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)